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 Abstract 
Considerable amounts of capital will be necessary if a green transformation is to be 
financed in the coming years. This paper gives a short introduction to the challenge of 
mobilising the required resources, particularly from private and institutional investors. 
More specifically, it provides an overview of eight public leveraging instruments that can 
be used to leverage private capital for green investments in developing countries and 
emerging economies. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses of these instruments and 
gives an assessment of their potential for a broader use. Additionally, the paper argues that 
more data transparency and quantitative research are needed to better assess the 
implications of the use of these instruments. Finally, it points out research gaps and 
proposes ideas for further research. The paper concludes by giving some policy 
recommendations. 
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1 Introduction 
Due to imminent climate change, considerable investments, especially in green infra-
structure, are needed to green the economy. As public budgets alone will not be able to 
provide the necessary financing, there is a necessity to mobilise private capital for green 
investments, particularly in developing countries and emerging markets. 
The contribution of this paper is to give an overview of eight relevant public leveraging 
instruments and to point out their advantages and disadvantages (Section 4) and their 
relevance (Section 5). Additionally, we identify research gaps and propose ideas for 
further research (Section 6). 
We show that the eight instruments studied in this paper have different advantages and 
weaknesses. More importantly, they are suited to various situations to differing degrees. 
The selection of an appropriate instrument depends on many factors: for instance, the 
overall purpose and the chosen role of the public donor or development bank, the project 
development phase, the desired leverage effect, and the availability of the instrument. 
However, much more research, especially quantitative research, is needed to better assess 
the implications of the use of different public leveraging instruments. To this end, broader 
knowledge about green finance has to be created and disseminated. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the statement of 
the problem and highlights important international processes that have a related agenda. 
Section 3 gives a short overview of the literature on green finance, especially on mappings 
of green finance flows and case studies. The above mentioned contribution is made in 
Sections 4 to 6. The final section presents a summary of the lessons learned and offers 
policy recommendations. 
2 The challenge: financing the green transformation 
Internationally we have a broad consensus on the need to change our unsustainable ways 
of living and to restructure our economies in a way that the planetary boundaries are 
respected. The transformation towards a sustainable economy, i.e. a green transformation,1 
is not only crucial for combating climate change, but also for improving the health 
conditions and the security of energy supply for hundreds of millions of people. Moreover, 
it can help to reduce costs for adaptation to climate extremes.2 At the Conference of the 
Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Cancún (COP16) in 2010, the international community adopted a 2°C target. Global 
warming beyond this threshold was considered to trigger serious environmental damage 
with catastrophic consequences for the planet, as well as for mankind. A recent report of 
                                                 
1 A definition of green transformation and some other relevant terms are given in Box 1. 
2 See WBGU (German Advisory Council on Global Change) (2011). 
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the World Bank (2012b) describes the scenario of a 4°C warmer climate with its 
cataclysmic changes and consequences for hundreds of millions of people. 
Greening the economy is an important strategy with which to combat climate change and 
to prevent worst case scenarios. A green transformation has manifold dimensions, the 
most important of which is to reduce carbon emissions and to secure sustainable energy 
for all. This includes offering secure universal access to modern energy supplies, doubling 
the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix, increasing energy efficiency, and 
phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.3 
Box 1: Key definitions 
For many of the terms used in this paper, we do not have internationally agreed definitions. Indeed, in 
most publications on this issue, the authors either do not define important key terms at all, or apply their 
own definitions. The inexistence of important definitions, for instance for “green finance”, “climate 
finance”, “green growth”, or “green transformation” is a serious hurdle - not only for statistical purposes, 
but also for clear communication and the mobilisation of financial resources. In this paper, however, we 
do not try to solve this difficulty. Rather we apply broad definitions as working assumptions that do not 
consider detailed nuances. 
• Green transformation: the pro-active restructuring of the economy in a way that respects planetary 
boundaries.* 
• Green finance: finance flows for investments that respect the planetary boundaries. 
• Green infrastructure investments: investments in infrastructure that take planetary boundaries into 
consideration. This includes renewable energy generation and distribution, energy efficient buildings 
and city planning, water supply and removal, and waste management. 
• Private capital: capital from private and institutional investors (such as pension funds, assurances, 
sovereign wealth funds) in a broad sense, including all those that have significant amounts of assets 
under management. Strictly speaking, private capital in this definition also includes public capital (e.g. 
of sovereign wealth funds). A negative definition of private capital would be: capital that is not in-
cluded in government budgets. 
• Leverage ratio: ratio of total funding to public funding. 
* This is the definition proposed by Schmitz / Becker (2013). 
A special focus has to be on developing countries and emerging economies for two 
reasons. First, these countries will suffer exceptionally from climate change. Second, due 
to the projected growth of these country groups and the related increase in emissions, 
combined with the strong path dependencies of the infrastructure investment decisions that 
are to be taken, it is crucial to select the green pathway right now and avoid lock-in 
effects. 
 
                                                 
3 See the illustrative sustainable development Goal number 7 of the High-Level Panel Report (UN 2013). 
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2.1 Financing needs – the search for investors 
The estimations of the actual financing needs for a green transformation vary significantly 
among sources, but it is certain that we are confronted with financing needs of trillions of 
USD: 
• The European Commission estimates that the European Union needs to invest about 
EUR 270 billion per year in low-carbon energy, energy efficiency and infrastructure.4 
• The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that for a green transformation, cu-
mulative investment in green infrastructure of about USD 36-42 trillion would be need-
ed between 2012 and 2030, i.e., approximately USD 2 trillion per year. Half of this 
amount, USD 1 trillion, is already being invested today.5 
• For the next years, and focusing only on the power sector, the IEA projects that USD 
6.35 trillion in total investments will be required from 2010 to 2020 for a reduction of 
energy related CO2 emissions of 50% by 2050, compared to 2005 levels, and that by 
2020 about USD 24 trillion investments would be required.6 
• The World Economic Forum refers to additional, incremental investment needs in clean 
energy infrastructure, low-carbon transport, energy efficiency, and forestry of at least 
USD 0.7 trillion per year to meet the climate-change challenge of limiting global 
warming to 2°C.7 
• The World Resources Institute indicates that, in order to reach the 2°C goal, developing 
countries will need USD 531 billion yearly up to 2050 for additional investments in en-
ergy supply and demand technologies.8 
It seems clear that public budgets alone will not meet the challenge.9 For instance, the 
commitment of the industrialised countries given at COP16 to provide USD 100 billion 
per year from 2020 onwards for mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries 
is only a drop in the bucket. Moreover, in the aftermath of the recent global crisis, where 
industrialised countries all over the world are confronted with the depressing budget 
constraints of their home economies, the question arises whether this international 
commitment is deemed to be just another important target that will be cited frequently but 
reached only by some single outriders – just as the 0.7% ODA/GNI target that was agreed 
on in 1970. 
Public interest has therefore recently concentrated on private investors who might have the 
capabilities to close the financing gap. Especially institutional investors (such as pension 
                                                 
4 European Commission (2013). 
5 International Energy Agency (2012). 
6 International Energy Agency (2012) 
7 World Economic Forum (2013). 
8 Polycarp / Brown / Fu-Bertaux (2013). 
9 IFC (2013a) estimate that, from 2010 to 2011, financial flows for green investments have been USD 350 
billion. 
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funds, insurance companies, or sovereign wealth funds) with their long-term investment 
horizon seem to be – at least theoretically – very adequate sources.10 
The reason for this is that, first of all, institutional investors have assets of more than USD 
70 trillion under management (Kaminker / Stewart 2012) and, thus, constitute a very 
promising source of funding. Furthermore, institutional investors – at least some of them11 
– have the potential to also finance long-term investments, which are of high importance 
for the establishment of green infrastructures. 
2.2 Investment barriers – not just in developing countries 
Unfortunately, the current importance of this group of investors for infrastructure, and 
even more, for green projects is rather remote. The OECD estimates that less than 1% of 
the assets of pension funds are invested in infrastructural projects worldwide (OECD 
2013a). At the same time, investments in green infrastructure projects in developing 
countries or emerging markets amount only to a tiny percentage of overall investments, 
and account, in consequence, only for a minimal fraction of this 1% of their investment 
volume. 
What are the reasons for the degree of reluctance on the part of institutional and private 
investors to engage in green investments all over the world? The answer is economically 
straightforward: the risk-return calculus of these investments is not attractive for them. 
This is basically the outcome to two problems: first, due to high fossil fuel subsidies, the 
return on green investments is limited; second: the (perceptions of) investment risks are 
too high. Both problems apply to developing and emerging countries as well as to 
industrialised countries. 
The problem with the fossil fuel subsidies is that they preclude the creation of a fair 
market price for carbon, making investments in new energies and energy efficiency 
unnecessary and unattractive. However, abolishment of fuel subsidies is not easy as there 
are powerful lobbies arguing in favour of them. Strand (2013) discusses and models 
various political economy aspects of fuel subsidies and gives explanations for the high 
prevalence of subsidies, particularly in autocracies and young democracies. 
While the former problem is easy to identify, investment risks are more complex as there 
are different types of risks that might form barriers for private sector engagement in green 
investments, some of which are of particular relevance for developing countries and 
emerging economies. 
                                                 
10 Interest in private sector funding, and especially institutional investors, is tremendous. For an overview 
of institutions and initiatives working on green finance, see Table A1 of the Appendix. 
11 Institutional investors are indeed a very heterogeneous group of investors with different investment 
behaviours and different barriers. See Nelson / Pierpont (2013) for a good overview; and Bernstein / 
Lerner / Schoar (2013) for the investment strategies of sovereign wealth funds. 
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The risks that apply to all countries in very much the same way are related to regulation, 
technology, and financing. Regulation risks include legitimate changes in the regulation of 
firms, financial intermediaries, and technologies that can change the profitability of a 
project. For instance, the reduction (or only the discussion about possible reductions) of 
feed-in-tariffs diminishes the calculated profits of new energy investments. Investments in 
new technologies in particular entail technological risks typical of the first years of 
innovations. Investments in green projects most often have a very long time-horizon. 
Consequently, also the possibility of acquiring additional financing during critical project 
development phases is relevant. Another financial risk is the liquidity of the investment, 
i.e., whether it is possible to sell project shares or bonds in financial markets without 
constraints. 
In addition to these general risks, investors in emerging economies and even more so in 
developing countries are confronted with macroeconomic and political country risks. 
These include, for instance, exchange rate volatility, inflation, capital market controls, 
expropriation, or civil disturbances and lead to more or less negative values for the 
country ratings of credit rating agencies. These ratings, then, influence the possibilities of 
the rated countries to get the financing they require. 
In actual fact, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (2012) argue that the estimation of 
country risks are systematically too high, which entails financial harm to developing 
countries and emerging economies. Also, investors themselves are affected as they miss 
business opportunities. However, whether the assessment of the risks is correct or 
exaggerated – and thus, reflecting perceived or real risks, does not really matter for the 
outcome, as the consequence is principally the same – private investors are often reluctant 
to invest in green infrastructure projects.12 
2.3 Enabling green investments – the second-best solution 
The first best solution to enable green investments would without doubt be the pricing of 
carbon emissions. Only if we have clear long-term prices for carbon emissions, will the 
external damages caused by the use of fossil fuel energies be included in the pricing and 
investment decisions of private actors. In such an economic environment, green 
technologies and investments on the one hand and traditional fossil fuel investments on 
the other would compete on an equal basis. The relative costs of green investments would 
improve and they would become automatically attractive options. Additionally, other 
market distortions in emerging and developing countries, the causes for the higher risks 
mentioned before, would have to be removed to make these countries more attractive for 
investors. 
                                                 
12 However, it does matter for the policy implications. 
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Unfortunately, these first best solutions will not be realised – at least not in the near future. 
Sadly to say, fossil fuel subsidy reforms are very hard to implement. Improving the 
general investment climate in the developing and emerging economies is not an easy task 
either. However, if we want to finance the desired green transformation, it seems 
inevitable that private investors must be on board. Consequently, second-, third- and 
fourth-best solutions come into play. 
One possibility of mobilising private investments is that public donors, development 
banks, and development finance institutions provide incentives and support to make 
private investors consider engaging in green investments. This is of particular relevance if 
they are supposed to invest in developing countries or emerging economies. For this, 
different public instruments might serve the purpose and a selection of them will be 
discussed further on in this paper. 
Another option – or rather the other side of the coin, as both approaches should go hand in 
hand – is to improve the enabling environment for green investments. A favourable 
enabling environment comprises various different aspects: national and international rules 
and regulations that are relevant for financing flows and investments form an as important 
part of it as green industrial policies that provide incentives through national policy 
mechanisms. Prominent examples are feed-in-tariffs that subsidise renewable energy 
production. But also overall governance performance, financial market development, the 
removal of technical, legal and administrative barriers for investments, transparency, and 
jurisdiction have an important stake in what makes up an enabling environment. 
Various different international bodies are currently discussing these two options for 
mobilising private capital. The most important discussions are probably anchored in the 
G20, the OECD, and UNFCCC, but even within these groups more than one initiative 
exists. An overview of relevant processes is given in Box 2. 
In this paper we will discuss the first option: public instruments to mobilise private capital. 
We focus explicitly on the mobilisation of private capital from international capital 
markets. The mobilisation of funds from domestic capital markets is without doubt also 
very important, but will not be analysed further in this paper.13 Furthermore, we explicitly 
exclude policies, policy support, and global dialogues on rules and regulations14 that help 
to provide an enabling environment for green investments in development countries and 
are as important for a green transformation as financing itself. Thus, policy instruments 
such as, for example, feed-in-tariffs or renewable energy quotas, and standards and 
regulations are outside the scope of this paper. 
                                                 
13 The IFC (2013a) states that domestic funding is the most important source for financing green projects. 
Also national development banks have an important role for the mobilisation of funds for climate 
finance. See Smallridge et al. (2013). 
14 See Spencer / Stevenson (2013) for an overview of the implications of new financial sector regulations 
(e.g. Basel III and Solvency II) on low-carbon investments in the European Union (EU); and Severinson / 
Yermo (2012) for the effects of recent and planned changes to solvency and accounting regulations on 
insurers and pension funds. 
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However, while discussing these instruments, it is crucial to always keep in mind that they 
are only a replacement – at best, a second-best solution. Unfortunately, public financial 
instruments to mobilise green investments always imply costs and they never strike at the 
heart of the problem and eliminate the misguided incentives that prevent investors from 
engaging in green investments. 
Box 2: Selected processes related to green finance 
G20 processes 
• The G20 Development Working Group established a Dialogue Platform for Inclusive Green Invest-
ments (DPIGI) that is to help mobilise public and private funds for inclusive green growth investments 
in developing countries. For the implementation of this DPIGI, the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) has been asked to provide some guidance in two rounds of stocktaking.  
• Recently, the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors have created a new Study Group on 
Financing for Investment, which will also focus on the role of the private sector as financiers for long-
term investments. This Study Group on Financing for Investment does not focus on “green issues”, 
however, due to path dependencies, nowadays long-term investments should also be green invest-
ments to avoid lock-in effects. 
OECD research projects 
• The OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs has a project on Institutional Investors and 
Long-term Investment which focuses especially on institutional investors and their possibilities and 
needs to provide funding for long-term investments. As the OECD hosts the Secretariat of the Interna-
tional Organisation of Pensions Supervisors (IOPS), they do not only have, in particular, expertise and 
contacts to pension funds, but also study the situation of insurance companies and sovereign wealth 
funds. 
• On behalf of the OECD Climate Change Expert Group (CCXG), the OECD coordinates and hosts the 
Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance, a network of interested governments, 
relevant research institutions, and international finance institutions. In the short term this initiative 
aims at developing a common methodology to measure private climate finance flows and at tracking 
the private climate finance to, between, and in developing countries. In the medium term, they want to 
advance further and also investigate other related topics of private green finance. 
UNFCCC discussion strands 
• The UNFCCC work programme on long-term finance (LTF) was implemented during COP17 and 
extended to the end of the year 2013. The aim of this work programme is to analyse options to mobi-
lise public and private capital for climate change investments.  
• Another related discussion takes place within the Board Meetings of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), 
whose structure and operating mode is not fully defined yet. The GCF will have a Private Sector Fa-
cility (PSF) that shall enable the GCF to finance private sector mitigation and adaptation activities. 
Currently, at the Board Meetings, the design and the financial instruments that the PSF will have are 
being discussed. 
G8 process 
• The G8 Social Impact Investment Forum in June 2013 has established a Social Impact Investment 
Taskforce which aims to report on related questions for the mobilisation of capital for impact invest-
ments that also include green and sustainable investments. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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3 Review of green finance literature 
In order to place the discussion of the public instruments to mobilise private investments 
into the right context and to gain an overview of the existing literature on green finance, 
we will cite selected publications briefly in the next two sub-sections.15 Roughly, green 
finance literature can be divided into mappings of green finance flows; and case studies on 
green investments. 
3.1 Inconsistent mappings of green finance flows 
Although various different researchers have made the effort to conduct mappings of green 
finance flows, a comprehensive picture does not exist so far. The reason for this is that the 
mappings differ in scope and methodology, and thus combining the different sub-maps is 
not straightforward.16 
The first hurdle becomes evident when we search for a generally agreed definition of 
green finance or climate finance in these publications (compare Box 1) as such common 
definitions simply do not exist. The same is true for the term “additionality”. A further 
inconsistency is whether the accounting of green finance flows is based on committed or 
disbursed funds. 
These are only the most evident challenges that have to be overcome in order to reach a 
consistent framework of accounting practices for green finance. Nevertheless, these 
mappings still provide the best overall information on green finance flows that exists up to 
today; and in the following table (Table 1) we will give a short summary of the most 
important ones. 
Table 1: Summary of mappings of green finance flows 
Publication Short Summary 
CPI’s Landscape of 
Climate Finance 
• A quite comprehensive mapping of climate finance has been conducted 
by the Climate Policy Initiative, published as the “Global Landscape of 
Climate Finance” and the “German Landscape of Climate Finance” 
(Buchner et al. (2013); Buchner et al. (2012); Juergens et al. (2012)). 
While the Global Landscape gives a good overview of international 
flows of financing, the latter publication focuses on Germany as one of 
the leaders in the transition to green societies. 
 
                                                 
15 For a more comprehensive literature review the reader might consult IFC (2012). An updated version of 
it is part of the second stocktaking for the G20 Developing Working Group concerning the Design of the 
G20 Dialogue Platform on Inclusive Green Growth. The extended literature review includes more than 
160 items and is accessible and easily reachable via a public software platform called “The inclusive 
green growth brain” (IFC 2013a). 
16 Caruso / Ellis (2013) compare different definitions and methods used for the tracking of climate finance. 
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Table 1: continued 
Publication Short Summary 
 • The appealing features of these publications are the many tables and 
figures to document the financial flows. The authors provide, for in-
stance, tables on the sources and intermediaries, adding extra information 
with regard to destinations of the financial flows, their estimated values, 
and some general facts. Their climate finance flows diagrams, also 
known as “spaghetti” diagrams, try to give a visual picture of the sources, 
intermediaries, instruments, and uses of climate finance. 
• The “spaghetti” diagrams in particular have been copied quite extensively 
into other publications; however, one should bear in mind that they suffer 
from the same weaknesses as the entire literature on mappings, i.e. lack 
of clear definitions, lack of reliable data sources, huge amounts of miss-
ing data that lead to “guesstimations” and/or gaps in the mappings. Nev-
ertheless, the “Landscape of Climate Finance” is probably the most cited 
mapping of green finance flows. 
WEF’s Green Investment 
Report 
 
• Another well-known paper is the “Green Investment Report” that was 
prepared by the World Economic Forum (2013) on behalf of the Green 
Growth Action Alliance (G2A2), a cooperation of more than 50 leading 
financial institutions, corporations, and nongovernmental organisations 
(The WEF acts as the secretariat of G2A2). 
• It is basically a compilation and synthesis of work undertaken by others 
on green finance and green investments. Publications of Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance (BNEF), the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA), the Organisation of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), the World Bank Group, and the World Resources Institute 
(WRI) feed into this report. 
• The Green Investment Report elaborates on the financing gap between 
business-as-usual investments and the amounts needed to face the climate 
change challenge, describes ways to unlock private finance for green in-
vestments, and gives an extensive overview of their data sources. Just as 
the CPI publication, the WEF report also contains some illustrative figures 
that have contributed to further publications in the green finance literature. 
WRI’s Public Financing 
Instruments 
 
• The World Resources Institute contributes to the mapping of climate-
related investments with a series on public financing instruments to lev-
erage private capital. So far, a paper that focuses on multilateral agencies 
has been published (Venugopal et al. (2012)). 
• The authors analyse the available instruments of the Global Environment 
Facility, the Clean Technology Fund, and the World Bank Group, and 
show which of these instruments have been used frequently. The paper il-
lustrates the amounts of financing from these agencies according to in-
strument, region of destination, and sector of project implementation. 
• In addition, it focuses on the composition of co-financiers for financed 
projects. Moreover, the authors discuss institutional barriers to leveraging 
private sector participation and give policy recommendations for public 
actors that might also be useful for the implementation of the Green Cli-
mate Fund. 
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Table 1: continued 
Publication Short Summary 
WRI’s Public Financing 
Instruments 
 
• The World Resources Institute contributes to the mapping of climate-
related investments with a series on public financing instruments to lev-
erage private capital. So far, a paper that focuses on multilateral agen-
cies has been published (Venugopal et al. (2012)). 
• The authors analyse the available instruments of the Global Environment 
Facility, the Clean Technology Fund, and the World Bank Group, and 
show which of these instruments have been used frequently. The paper il-
lustrates the amounts of financing from these agencies according to in-
strument, region of destination, and sector of project implementation. 
• In addition, it focuses on the composition of co-financiers for financed 
projects. Moreover, the authors discuss institutional barriers to leverag-
ing private sector participation and give policy recommendations for 
public actors that might also be useful for the implementation of the 
Green Climate Fund. 
UNEP BFI CCWG’s 
Mapping of Climate 
Finance 
 
• Since 2008, the UNEP Bilateral Finance Institutions Climate Change 
Working Group (UNEP BFI CCWG) has documented the annual cli-
mate change financial flows to developing countries (UNEP (2012)). 
The data are provided by the international finance institutions that are 
members of the group, namely Agence Française de Développement 
(AFD), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), KfW Devel-
opment Bank, and the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation 
(NEFCO). Data are obtained by financial surveys and interviews. 
• The climate change financial flows of these four international finance 
institutions are divided into mitigation and adaptation finance and are 
broken down into regions, sectors, and instruments. The latter include 
grants, concessional loans, non-concessional loans and others. In their 
2012 report, UNEP BFI CCWG claims that 13% of the total flows from 
multilateral, bilateral, and national development finance institutions are 
attributable to AFD, JICA, KfW, and NEFCO (as a total they refer to 
the CPI global climate finance of USD 77 billion). 
IDFC’s Mapping of Green 
Finance 
 
• A similar approach has been carried out by Ecofys on behalf of the Inter-
national Development Finance Club (IDFC) (Höhne et al. (2012)). They 
have mapped the green finance delivered by the 19 member development 
banks and calculated a total amount of USD 89 billion in 2011. 
• As apposed to the approach of the UNEP BFI CCWG, they map green 
finance and not climate change finance, and due to the differences in meth-
odologies, the total amounts of finance flows cannot be compared easily. 
• Moreover, they apply a breakdown of the data into mitigation, adapta-
tion, and other environment finance flows, as well as into the sector of 
investment, and whether the flows originate from OECD countries or 
not, and whether they are destined for OECD countries or not. Howev-
er, they do not further distinguish between regions, and they do not 
provide information on instruments at all. 
Public instruments to leverage private capital for green investments in developing countries 
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Table 1: continued 
Publication Short Summary 
WRI/ODI/OCN’s Fast Start 
Finance 
 
• Another strand of mapping activities takes a closer look at the fast-start 
finance contributions, which refer to the USD 30 billion that developed 
countries have committed under the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for the years 2010 to 2012. 
• The World Resources Institute (WRI), Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI), and the Open Climate Network produce, for instance, a series of 
studies on the definitions, delivery, and way of reporting of the fast-
start finance commitments of Germany, Japan, UK, and US (e.g. 
Harmeling et al. (2013)). 
• For the same set of countries, the ODI has prepared a series of back-
ground notes on private climate finance support and the way public fi-
nance can mobilise private funds for climate related investments (see, 
e.g., Whitley / Mohanty (2013)). 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
3.2 The rag rug of case studies 
While in the literature on this topic we find a rag rug of case studies on green investments, 
the coverage is quite limited.17 Similar to the mappings of financial flows, there are only a 
few original research publications and many that just cite research conducted by others. 
Moreover, the variation of countries and sectors is quite limited, and some of the projects 
have been studied in different research projects. 
Basically, a handful of institutions and researchers provide the bulk of case studies. 
• First of all, the World Resources Institute has published quite a number of different 
studies (see for instance Venugopal et al. (2012) and Polycarp / Brown / Fu-Bertaux 
(2013)). 
• Also, the San Giorgio Group, a working group established by the Climate Policy Initia-
tive with the goal of conducting case studies on effective green finance, offers various 
case studies (Buchner / Heller / Wilkinson 2012). 
• Further studies have been analysed by the OECD, UNDP, and Spratt / Griffith-Jones 
(2013). 
• Many of these studies have been gathered together in the Green Investment Report of 
the World Economic Forum (2013). 
Especially the OECD and the San Giorgio Group currently continue to work on new case 
studies. 
                                                 
17 As in the previous sub-section, we refer in this paper only to the most important publications. 
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Figure 2: Sector coverage of case studies 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s representation. 
Deducing concrete recommendations for a particular type of project from these lessons 
learned might, however, be quite challenging as the evidence is still limited to a few 
specific examples. A first approach to help to profit from the lessons learned of case 
studies that have been conducted has been undertaken by the World Bank. It has 
implemented the “Renewable Energy Financial Instrument Tool (REFINe)”18, an 
interactive Web tool that supports policymakers in low income countries in better 
understanding how financial instruments can help to scale up renewable energy 
technologies. In addition to this interactive application that suggests the adequate 
instrument for selected barriers and risks, the website stores about 40 case studies that 
serve as examples for the use of different instruments.19 
4 Overview of relevant public leveraging instruments 
In the following we will present various different public leveraging instruments and 
elaborate on their weaknesses and strengths as well as the role the public sector is 
                                                 
18 http://www-esd.worldbank.org/refine/index.cfm 
19 These case studies have not been included in the overview above because it is not possible to deduce full 
information on the project volume and possible contributions of the private sector (the website does not 
focus on the composition of finance contributions). As a consequence, it is not clear whether these case 
studies can serve as examples for the mobilisation of private funds with the help of public instruments, 
which is the focus of this paper. 
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assuming by choosing to use this specific instrument. Moreover, we will try to assess the 
leverage potential and the perception of these instruments.20  
We will focus on three different types of instruments: first, instruments that provide 
financing directly to projects; second, instruments that do not directly transfer money, but 
transfer knowledge or mitigate risk; and third, instruments that are used to raise additional 
private funds that, then, can be transferred to green projects via one of the above 
mentioned instruments. Equity, grants, loans, and credit lines are examples of the first 
category of public financing instruments; guarantees and technical assistance fall into the 
second category; and green bonds and structured funds are the selected examples for the 
final category of instruments. There are certainly still a number of further instruments that 
the public donor might consider using, however, we will concentrate on this selection as 
they are the most relevant ones. 
These are apparently all well-known and proven development financing instruments. The 
instruments under study are neither innovative nor tailored especially to the needs of green 
financing. The reason for this is that there is no necessity to create radically new 
instruments for green investments. Rather the opposite is important: if they are to attract 
investors, instruments need to be simple. Thus, instead of trying to be innovative in the 
creation of instruments, it is preferable to facilitate green investment through new 
combinations of the present approaches, by applying well-known instruments to the 
specific context of green investment. This might include combinations of different 
instruments for different phases of the project cycle of green investments. The next section 
will elaborate more on this aspect. 
This section, which first of all presents the different instruments, builds on the following 
publications: UNEP (2008), World Bank (2012a), Spratt / Griffith-Jones (2013), Climate 
Investment Funds / World Bank (2012), and Venugopal / Srivastava (2012) as well as on 
discussions with several experts. 
4.1 Providing funding 
Equity 
Public donors that provide equity to a project are giving a capital contribution without 
receiving any guarantee of repayment in exchange. Equity providers acquire ownership of 
the project; thus, this form of financing constitutes a strong commitment. 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately, development banks like World Bank, IFC, or KfW do not provide data on the use of their 
instruments nor do they publish detailed project financing information (instruments used, co-financiers 
etc.). Information on the German climate-relevant ODA is provided in Box A1 of the Appendix. 
However, the statistics on the instruments are not directly relevant for the purpose of this paper, as 
information about the instruments that have been applied to the projects is not provided. 
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There are quite convincing reasons for the use of equity to provide financing to green 
projects. Equity reduces the risk of other investors, especially of debt investors, as there is 
full recourse on equity in the case of project failure. For projects, equity is, thus, 
fundamental to attracting further financing. Moreover, public financiers as equity 
providers can send out a signal of viability and provide accreditation for the project, which 
again helps to attract further investors. 
However, the opposite might also be true, as public ownership might also signal more 
bureaucracy and higher standards. There are some more arguments against the use of 
equity as a leveraging instrument. Providing equity entails significant transaction costs, 
and only if developed financial markets exist, will it be possible to exit from such 
investments through the sale of shares. In addition, as mentioned already above, 
shareholders are the last to be compensated in the case of failure. Being one of the main 
reasons for the leverage potential of equity, this fact might also be one of the main 
arguments against the provision of equity. 
The mode of action for the potential leverage effect works through the provision of long-
term, often initial financing and the signalling of project viability which might crowd-in 
private investments. Still, the leverage effect of equity is fairly low. 
The role of the public sector, when using equity as an instrument, is above all providing 
finance and only to a lesser degree mitigating risk and increasing reputation. Especially 
due to the high transaction costs, this instrument is only applicable to larger projects. As 
the commitment of the public donor is high, and such a donor is consequently selecting 
only highly qualified projects, it might be difficult to find a sufficiently large number of 
projects to upscale the use of equity as a leverage instrument. Project developers might 
also be quite reluctant to choose in favour of equity as they might not want to transfer 
ownership to the public stakeholder. 
EQUITY 
Strength Weakness Applicability 
• risk reduction for other 
investors 
• gives accreditation  
• shareholders are the last to be 
compensated 
• high transaction costs  
• only feasible for larger pro-
jects (due to high transaction 
costs) 
Grants 
The next instrument that will be considered in more detail are grants, which constitute 
provision of financing without costs for the project developer. The funding will not be 
paid back, and, in contrast to equity investments, no ownership is transferred. 
The persuasive strength of this instrument is its simplicity: it is really easy to implement 
and to manage as there are no ongoing administration costs, besides the monitoring of the 
project. On the other hand, the use of this leveraging instrument is the most risky one for 
donors: they have often limited control over the use of the capital and no recourse to it. 
Nannette Lindenberg 
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Grants do not give incentives to project developers to deliver, and there is no return on the 
invested capital. Additionally, the risk of creating market distortions by favouring certain 
projects over others must not be overlooked. 
The mode of action of grants as leveraging instruments is to provide long-term finance 
and to reduce total project costs to make the project affordable. Often, grants are used to 
cover costs during the highest risk development phase and by this provide confidence to 
private investors. The potential of the leveraging effect depends particularly on the timing 
of the allocation. If a grant is given to a running business, it probably replaces possible 
private financing, and the leveraging ratio will be consequently low. However, if the grant 
is handed out during the development phase, this instrument has a medium-to-high 
leverage potential. 
The role of the public sector or development bank, again, is providing financing, and 
grants are very easily applicable to all kind of projects. Thus for the public donor it is a 
simple instrument. Project developers are most probably very much in favour of receiving 
a grant as they receive funding without any risks. 
GRANTS 
Strength Weakness Applicability 
• simple to implement and 
manage (no ongoing admin-
istration) 
• most risky for donor: limited 
control and no recourse 
• do not give incentives for 
delivery 
• easily applicable to all kind 
of projects 
• especially for early project 
development phase 
Loans 
Very often public donors resort to lending in order to mobilise private capital, i.e., they are 
providing a loan that has to be repaid (with interest). In most cases these loans are 
concessional or flexible and can thus be repaid with a lower than market-rate interest rate 
or with an extended repayment schedule. Sometimes the loan contract even allows for 
modifications. But non-concessional loans can also be used to leverage private capital for 
green investments. 
Indeed, all types of loans can serve the purpose of signalling confidence and the viability 
of a green project. Beyond that, they can lower the financing costs, and by this, increase 
the profitability of a project. In contrast to grants, loans can even incentivise project 
viability due to the repayment obligation. For the public lender, an advantage of loans is 
that the repayment can be used to fund further projects. 
However, there are also some downsides of using loans to leverage private funds. First of 
all, due diligence is needed to verify the financial viability of the projects, which increases 
administration costs. Furthermore, it is hard to estimate the degree of concessionality that 
is needed to provide useful funding to the project without wasting public money through 
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the unnecessary use of subsidies. Another critical issue is the risk of creating market 
distortions through the selection of projects. 
The mode of action of public loans is, thus, above all reducing project costs and providing 
long-term financing. The leverage ratio, however, is generally low. 
The role of the public sector is, first of all, in providing financing, but also in increasing 
the reputation of the project. Due to the weaknesses of this instrument, especially due to 
the high demands for project evaluation, the applicability of direct loans is limited to 
projects of larger scale. Usually public donors, find it difficult not only to select adequate 
projects, but also to identify generally eligible projects. 
LOANS 
Strength Weakness Applicability 
• lower capital financing costs 
• obligation to repay can give 
incentives for project  
viability 
• need for due diligence  
increases costs 
• degree of concessionality is 
hard to estimate 
• projects of relatively large 
scale (project evaluation) 
• more developed projects  
Credit lines 
A solution to the problem of identifying eligible projects might be overcome through the 
use of credit lines. This is an instrument for the provision of loans through private sector 
financial intermediaries, i.e., debt is provided for on-lending to local banks that have the 
freedom to choose the interest rates and charges that will be applied to the customer. 
Credit lines are used for outreach and diversification and in order to develop local 
expertise in project finance. 
Credit lines have several appealing strengths. Besides the advantages that also apply to 
direct loans, e.g., providing incentives for project viability, there are some additional ones: 
The first is that the public donor does not have to spend time and money on the selection 
of projects. Moreover, it can even be assumed that local banks should have significant 
advantages in doing this through their inside knowledge of the local business environment. 
Further, credit lines can increase the comfort and the awareness of the financial 
intermediary involved in the deal in lending to new sectors or project types. Moreover, the 
financial intermediary might even complement the funding provided with further own 
resources. Lastly, as apposed to the projects themselves, the financial intermediaries are 
fairly stable partners for the public donor as the working relation might last for several 
years. Credit lines are, thus, in various aspects a sustainable solution for providing project 
financing. 
Analogically to the strengths, the weaknesses of credit lines are very much the same as 
those of direct loans, i.e., the need for due diligence, and the risk of favouring certain 
projects. Also, there are a number of additional disadvantages if the lending is executed 
through the intermediation of local financial entities: The first is that the risk of creating 
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market distortions does not only apply to the project level but also to the selection of 
intermediaries, as not all possible financial institutions might participate in the credit line 
programme. It might, thus, be possible that the public donor facilitates the creation of 
market power through newly acquired knowledge and skills in the banking sector. 
Another problem is that the accounting procedures of the public donor and the financial 
intermediary might diverge and, thus, implicate additional costs if the local bank has to 
report in the requested formats. More important, however, are several aspects related to 
the classical principal-agent-problem: As the financial intermediary is free to choose the 
applied interest rates and charges, the project might not receive subsidised rates at all. It is 
possible that all subsidies only go directly to the intermediary. The related uncertainty is, 
thus, how much concessionality does the local bank need to engage in these lending 
activities? Moreover, the financial intermediary might take too many risks in lending or 
the public funds might be used for the commercial interests of the intermediary instead of 
the actual public policy objective. 
The underlying mode of action of credit lines is not only the provision of funds for 
specific green projects, but also the further development of the financial system. The focus 
of the public donor when using credit lines is on enabling the partner bank to use a new 
financial product for a wide range of customers or to facilitate access to financing for 
certain target groups, such as low-income households or small and medium enterprises. 
The leverage potential is not very high; however, it is seen more as an investment in future 
private lending facilities. 
The role of the public sector, consequently, is first of all to provide knowledge, followed 
by alleviating risks and providing funding, respectively refinancing for local banks. 
Especially, due to the advantages of this instrument, credit lines can be applied quite 
broadly and they are often the preferred instrument by development banks. From the 
recipient side, the perception depends on the development phase of the project: at an early 
stage, a project developer would probably prefer to receive subsidised funding, while at a 
later stage the advantage of establishing business relations with a local bank might prevail. 
 
CREDIT LINES 
Strength Weakness Applicability 
• increased comfort and 
awareness of financial in-
termediaries in lending to 
new sectors/project types 
• financial intermediary can 
complement funding with 
own resources 
• principal-agent problems 
• accounting procedures might 
diverge and increase costs 
• wide-spread use 
• more developed projects 
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4.2 Transferring knowledge or risk 
Guarantees 
Further relevant products that are needed to mobilise private funding for green investments 
in developing countries are guarantees that help to reduce investment risks, both real risks 
and perceived risks.21 Guarantees are offered against a payment of a fee and specifically 
cover defined risks, such as political risks, e.g. expropriation, currency transfer restrictions, 
war, or civil disturbances, and also legitimate policy changes, such as reductions in feed-in-
tariffs. Often, guarantees are paid to partner banks to make them lend to green projects. 
As guarantees are targeted to the specific risks of individual projects, they can crowd-in 
private financing. Besides, it is relatively easy to obtain political approval for them as 
there is no need for high upfront funding. 
The downsides of guarantees are the high transaction costs. Normally, a guarantee has to 
be custom-designed for each project and it is not easy to structure the instrument in a way 
that it provides good incentives. The underlying problem is that the risk has to be assessed 
properly, which can be very difficult. The liabilities have to be accounted for dependent 
on the assessment of the risk. 
Moreover, as guarantees are not counted as ODA22, donors might be reluctant to offer 
them. Similar to all other instruments that are based on cooperation with local banks, 
guarantees, too, are prone to principal-agent-problems as the banks might not screen the 
clients with the necessary prudence. Adverse selection might become a serious problem if 
there is full risk coverage by the public donor and, consequently, windfall gains might be 
provided to the banks. Generally, the public issuer of guarantees is assuming significant 
risks without taking control over them. 
Box 3: Guarantees provided by MIGA 
MIGA, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank Group is one institution that has 
specialised in the provision of political risk insurance guarantees to private sector investors and lenders. 
However, the risks that are especially important for green investments, namely commercial and 
technological risks, are not covered.  
The mode of action is not direct financing, as the donor transfers funds only if the guarantee 
case occurs. Generally, guarantees are custom-designed, but can also be offered for a set of 
similar projects as a more standardised product. The purpose of these instruments is to crowd-
in long-term financing by improving the (perceived) risk-reward profile of green projects. 
The leverage ratio of guarantees is usually high and the role of the public donor is clearly 
defined: it is risk mitigation. Guarantees can generally be applied to all kinds of project; 
                                                 
21 See Box 3 for an example. 
22 Guarantees do not represent a financial flow and are consequently not ODA-eligible financial products. 
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however, due to the high transaction costs, up-scaling of the use of this instrument might 
be limited. Guarantees are highly demanded by projects and private investors. Public 
donors, however, are often reluctant to offer them; a problem that might be alleviated if 
guarantees were better taken into account in ODA accounting. 
GUARANTEES 
Strength Weakness Applicability 
• crowd-in private financing 
• easy to obtain political ap-
proval as there is no high 
up-front financing 
• high transaction costs 
• accounting is difficult 
• not fully accountable for ODA
• for projects in a more  
developed phase of  
implementation 
Technical assistance 
The second instrument that will be considered is technical assistance, which can play an 
important role as a supplement to the above mentioned financial instruments and might 
include, for instance, market research, business planning, staff training, or the 
establishment of technical standards and engineering due diligence. Technical assistance 
can be provided both to the projects and to partner financial intermediaries that 
implement, for example, a credit line. 
The real strength of technical assistance is that it can help to establish a successful track-
record for financing or implementing green projects. If the instrument is targeted to 
partner banks they should be capacitated to provide additional financing in the future. 
The evident weaknesses of technical assistance are the high transaction costs due to the 
need to custom design them in each case. 
The mode of operation is simple: technical assistance should build capacities both for 
project developers and financial institutions, and by this, signal viability for the specific 
type of investments. 
Just as for most of the custom-designed instruments, the leverage ratio of technical 
assistance can be high. The role of the public donor clearly consists of providing knowledge, 
and the potential applicability of technical assistance, again analogous to guarantees, does 
not have limits. Summing up, technical assistance is useful for projects and banks, and very 
often, it is an important supplement to the provision of further financial instruments. 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
Strength Weakness Applicability 
• facilitates further financing 
• helps to establish track-
record 
• high transaction costs • broad range 
• also for projects in an early 
development phase 
• useful for projects and banks 
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4.3 Raising additional private funds 
Green bonds 
Green bonds are fixed income products that are in the majority of the cases related to 
financing activities that mitigate climate risk.23 
The strength of green bonds is that they can bundle various projects together in a single 
security. This has several advantages: Bonds are a financing vehicle that facilitate the 
matching of investors and small projects, and by this, reduce financing costs. Also, bonds 
offer the possibility of diversification by including different projects, and they can 
consequently reduce investment risks. An important advantage is furthermore that they are a 
fixed income product and therefore best suited for the investment preferences of institutional 
investors that usually have up to 90% of their portfolio invested in fixed income products. 
A shortcoming of green bonds is that sophisticated markets are needed to analyse, price, 
and trade the bonds. Besides, the administration costs are quite high, especially as 
identifying eligible projects for the inclusion in the product is not straightforward. 
The mode of action of this instrument is as following: A public donor or a development 
bank issues the green bond that is often managed by a commercial bank. These bonds are 
then rated and investors can invest and trade them just as other traditional bonds. The 
leverage ratio of green bonds is high. This is especially true for the green bonds of 
multilateral development banks as they have an excellent rating. 
Box 4: Green Bonds 
The Climate Bonds Initiative (2013) has analysed the 2013 climate-related bonds universe. They report that, 
in 2013, USD 346 billion climate-related bonds are outstanding, thus the amount has nearly doubled since 
2012 (USD 174 billion). Most of the bonds are raised for the transport sector (USD 263 billion), followed by 
the energy sector (USD 41 billion) and finance (USD 32 billion). In their report they only analyse a subset of 
investment-grade, benchmark-type outstanding bonds (USD 163 billion). Among these bonds, the whole 
band of rating categories is available, although 66% of these bonds have an AA- or an AAA-rating. 
Example: World Bank 
Since 2008, the year of inaugural issuance of green bonds, the World Bank (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, IBRD) has issued about USD 3.5 billion green bonds through 57 
transactions. The bonds have been issued in 17 currencies. World Bank green bonds are fixed income 
investments with a triple-A rating. Eligible projects are selected by environment specialists of the World 
Bank. The credit quality of the green bonds is identical to any other World Bank bonds and the repayment 
of the bonds does not depend on project performance. Thus, the investors do not have to assume project 
risks. Rather they profit from over 60 years of World Bank’s experience in issuing bonds. 
Example: International Finance Corporation 
The International Finance Corporation also offers green bonds. In 2013 IFC issued two times a USD 1 
billion green bond supporting climate-related investments in emerging markets. With this second sale 
IFC's total green bond issuances amount to USD 3.4 billion. 
Source: Climate Bonds Initiative (2013), World Bank (2013), IFC (2013b). 
                                                 
23 See Box 4 for examples. 
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Consequently, the role of the public sector is to offer an adequate product by issuing green 
bonds, and increasing – depending on the own standing – the reputation of the type of 
investments that are financed by the bond. The way green bonds are designed, which also 
makes up most of the appealing attractiveness of them, implies that it is not easy to 
upscale the use of this specific instrument in the way that would be needed to provide the 
required financing for a green transformation. Another shortcoming is that institutional 
investors, one of the main target groups of green bonds, are only interested in these 
products if they are offered at a sufficiently high scale. Small quantities of green bonds are 
not attractive for them. Moreover, as these bonds are generally not included in the relevant 
investors’ benchmarks, they are rarely considered by professional fund managers. This 
might also be due to the fact that green bonds are a relative new instrument with limited 
experience.24 
GREEN BONDS 
Strength Weakness Applicability 
• potential to bundle projects 
reduces risk and financing 
costs 
• sophisticated markets re-
quired to be able to analyse 
and price the bonds 
• high administration costs 
• only for developed projects 
and proven technologies 
Structured funds 
Yet another instrument to pool projects into one product is a structured fund.25 Structured 
funds are instruments that have been used for quite some time for micro-financing; 
however, for the purpose of green investments they are relatively new instruments. 
Besides the pooling of projects they also allow for a transformation of maturity, i.e. short-
term into long-term, and they can create different risk categories. They have the 
particularity of comprising different tranches that are tailored to the volume and risk 
preferences of the potential investors. Thus, structured funds are most useful when 
information is imbalanced – as in the case of green investments – and consequently risks 
are overpriced. Generally, structured funds are managed by a commercial bank, and the 
public donor takes the tranche with the greatest risk and the smallest reward expectations. 
Compared to green bonds, structured funds are more suited for individual projects while 
green bonds are more appropriate for larger projects and more developed markets. While 
green bonds are the more standardised product, structured funds can offer more variety 
and diversification. Another distinction between green bonds and structured funds is that 
the latter is above all interesting for smaller institutional investors, such as pension funds, 
as they will hardly offer the scale needed by the big players. 
                                                 
24 For instance, the World Bank has only issued green bonds since 2008. See Box 4. 
25 See Box 5 for an example. 
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Structured funds have several advantages. The first are just the same as those for green 
bonds, i.e., structured funds reduce the investment transaction costs, offer the possibility 
of diversification, and improve borrowers’ access to finance for small projects. 
Additionally, they offer investment opportunities for investors with different risk-return 
tolerances. By taking the first loss and subordinated position in the fund, the public donor 
can improve the risk-reward calculus of private investors. Moreover, the common practice 
of coǦinvestment by several public bodies (see for instance the box on the Global Climate 
Partnership Fund (Box 5)) seems to give confidence to private investors. Generally 
speaking, structured funds provide intermediate funding between equity and debt as they 
reduce the risk for senior lenders without taking away control from the project developers. 
They make efficient use of scarce public resources and they are an efficient way of 
coordinating donor activities. An expert from a development bank that set up such funds 
goes even further claiming that structured funds can provide the solution for most 
problems that hinder more private engagement. The knowledge gap is met with the public 
private partnership structure of such a fund, country risk is reduced by diversification, 
currency risk by hedging, transparency risk by the regulation under a Luxembourg regime, 
and the viability risk is reduced by demonstrated profitability. 
The outflow side of a structured fund often has different components. For instance, the 
Green for Growth Fund Southeast Europe has three pillars on the outflow side. They give 
credit lines for banks and they make up to 30% direct project investments, both at 
commercial rates. Additionally, they provide technical assistance to their partner banks to 
build up the capacity and knowledge to invest in energy efficiency and renewable energy. 
This last pillar makes the cooperation very attractive to those partner banks that want to 
engage in a new sector. 
However, structured funds entail high transaction costs as it is not easy to find many 
adequate projects or partner institutions for the outflow of funds. Besides, these structured 
funds are often custom-designed and not easy to copy. Generally, a high number of 
stakeholders are involved, and thus, the demands in terms of project preparation and 
review are very high. It takes quite some time to make a structured fund operational in 
such a way that private investors can be invited to participate: this is only possible once 
the fund has a sufficient diversification and track-record. Furthermore, public donors take 
over high risks without receiving much control, as the fund is managed by a commercial 
bank. Accordingly, this instrument as well entails the risk of general principal-agent-
problems. On the other side, some investors might be reluctant to invest in a fund with 
public participation as they prefer to keep complete control of the fund and the investment 
decisions. 
The mode of operation resembles the one of credit lines: The objective of structured funds 
is first of all the refinancing of financial institutions with the aim of expanding their range 
of financial products. An important advantage, however, is that structured funds might not 
only crowd-in co-financing of the local partner bank, but also of further private investors 
with more traditional risk-reward expectations. 
24 
Box 5
GCPF
econo
GCPF
by the
Also t
At th
Germ
The fu
credit 
and r
constr
power
Figur
Sourc
The le
relativ
might 
pure a
issuin
neede
relativ
develo
 
: Global C
 is a structur
mies. It is lo
 had a portfo
 BMU (Germ
he KfW, IFC
e end of 20
any's largest p
nd’s capital 
lines for sma
enewable en
uction of a ph
). 
e 3: Share
e: https://g
verage rati
ely facile. 
be the mo
llocation o
g of green b
d to close 
ely new, v
pment ban
 Germa
limate Part
ed fund that 
cated in Luxe
lio of USD 1
an Federal M
, and the Dan
12, the first
ension funds
is given to loc
ll and medium
ergies. Besid
otovoltaic po
holder struct
cpf.lu/ 
o of structu
The role of
st importan
f financing
onds, up-s
the curren
ery sophis
ks will prob
n Developme
nership Fund
aims at provi
mbourg and 
50 million. Th
inistry for th
ish governmen
 institutional
, contributed E
al financial i
 enterprises 
es, the GCP
wer plant in 
ure of the GC
red funds i
 the public
t, followed
 might be 
caling the o
t financing
ticated pro
ably not la
nt Institute / D
 (GCPF) 
ding climate 
managed by 
e initial capi
e Environme
t provided o
 investor, Ä
UR 30 milli
nstitutions in 
(SMEs) and h
F also fina
South Africa 
PF 
 
s, conseque
 sector is m
 by alleviat
the least im
ffer of stru
 gap migh
duct might
y their main
eutsches Ins
finance to de
the Deutsche
tal – a EUR 3
nt, Nature C
wn funds. 
rzteversorgun
on to the GCP
developing c
ouseholds for
nces investm
(generating u
ntly, high a
anifold. O
ing risk, an
portant ro
ctured fun
t be diffic
 be a flag
 focus on t
titut für Entw
veloping cou
Bank. Until 
2.5 million g
onservation a
g Westfalen
F. 
ountries and e
 investments 
ents directly
p to 1.8 gigaw
s crowding
ffering an 
d providin
le. But aga
ds to the le
ult in the 
ship, but p
his instrum
Nannette Lin
icklungspolit
ntries and em
the end of 20
rant - was pr
nd Nuclear S
-Lippe, one 
merging mar
in energy eff
, for instan
att hours of 
-in senior 
adequate p
g reputatio
in, similar 
vel that wo
near future
ublic dono
ent. 
denberg 
ik (DIE) 
erging 
12 the 
ovided 
afety). 
of the 
kets as 
iciency 
ce the 
annual 
 
debt is 
roduct 
n. The 
to the 
uld be 
. This 
rs and 
Public instruments to leverage private capital for green investments in developing countries 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 25 
STRUCTURED FUNDS 
Strength Weakness Applicability 
• reduce investment transac-
tion costs 
• possibility of diversification 
• offer investment to investors 
with different risk-return 
tolerances 
• improve risk-reward calcu-
lus of private investors (first 
loss, subordinated position) 
• high transaction cost • relatively limited due to 
transaction and coordination 
costs 
• only for developed projects 
5 The relevance of the presented instruments 
5.1 Status quo 
After presenting the eight different instruments and pointing out their advantages and 
disadvantages26, it is now the appropriate time to give some tentative information on their 
scope and relevance. Unfortunately, a rigorous assessment is not possible as data on their 
usage is rarely available.27 Indeed, development banks often have not extracted the 
information out of their project documentation at all or they are reluctant to publish these 
data for external researchers.28 Even worse, it is not even feasible to get an overview of the 
practical relevance of the different instruments by now.29 
As far as transparency is concerned, the Inter-American Development Bank that offers a 
searchable project-database on its homepage is an exception. Table 2 and Figure 4 show 
the amounts that the IDB has approved to spend via the different instruments for financing 
climate change projects. It is interesting to note that the amounts vary extremely from 
USD 2.9 million in 2006 to USD 918.9 million in 2011. However, there is a clear positive 
                                                 
26 See Table A2 in the Appendix for a brief overview. 
27 Consequently, this analysis can only be subjective and descriptive, for a more objective assessment a 
comprehensive survey of different actors, donors, recipients, and intermediaries would be necessary. 
28 For instance, the International Financial Corporation does not publish statistics on the use of their 
instruments for climate finance. However, Patel / Musiü (2013) have published a first overview of their 
climate-related activities. 
29 Using OECD DAC statistics it is possible to gain some information on climate-related ODA by making 
use of the so-called Rio-markers. However, these statistics only include grants, equity and loans. For 
Germany, the information that can be extracted is illustrated in an exemplary manner in Box A1 of the 
Appendix. 
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trend in the total approved amounts for climate-related investments observable in the last 
years.30 
Table 2: Instruments used by the IDB for climate finance 
Instruments Years 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Grants 0.50 5.73 1.26 2.90 2.24 9.00 20.80 16.48 25.61 27.00 7.55 
– thereof 
monetary 
grants 
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.35 0.24 0.05 12.43 2.85 25.61 23.75 7.55 
– thereof 
technical 
cooperation 
0.50 5.73 1.26 1.55 2.00 8.95 8.37 13.63 0.00 3.25 0.00 
Loans 75.00 0.00 200.70 0.00 40.00 69.26 171.50 335.00 893.29 299.51 0.00 
Guarantees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 200.00 0.00 
Investments 0.00 5.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 75.50 11.23 201.96 2.90 42.24 78.26 192.30 351.48 918.90 526.51 7.55 
Note: In USD million. 
Source: Author’s representation. Data is from: http://www.iadb.org/en/projects. 
Loans have traditionally been the most important instrument for IDB activities and have 
accounted for over 95% of IDB’s commitments. The relative importance of loans and 
credit lines is representative for other development banks as these institutions are quite 
concerned about the outflow of their funds. 
Only in 2012 was there important spending through guarantees (38% of the approved 
amounts) at IDB. The importance of guarantees can easily be over-interpreted, however, 
when looking at Figure 4, as the USD 200 million were assigned to just one project, 
namely the “Reventazon Hydroelectric Power Project” in Costa Rica, which consists of 
the design, construction, operation and maintenance of a 305.5 MW hydroelectric plant. 
Still, this guarantee is the first one for at least 10 years. It remains to be evaluated in the 
coming years whether this has been the beginning of a shift in the instrument mix of 
IDB’s activities. 
However, similar to using case studies, we should be cautious in drawing any generalisations 
from the applied instrument-mix of the Inter-American Development Bank as its activities 
might have a different focus than those of other development banks or development financing 
institutions. 
                                                 
30 It is, however, unclear whether this increase is due to a real increase of climate-related activities, or just 
due to better accounting practices, as the IDB as well as other development banks discovered their 
interest in calculating climate change-related funding only some years ago. 
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Figure 4: Instruments used by the IDB 
 
 
Source: Author’s representation. Data is from http://www.iadb.org/en/projects. 
5.2 Timing 
A very relevant aspect to keep in mind when comparing the various different public 
instruments is that they are relevant for different project development phases (see Figure 
5). For projects in the initial development phase, grants or technical assistance tend to be 
used and in the initial realisation phase, equity and loans have an important part to play. 
Only once the project is bankable does it make sense to use credit lines and guarantees, 
while green bonds and structured funds can only provide financing to quite mature 
projects. 
Figure 5: Relevance of instruments during project development phase 
 
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT PHASE 
 
Source: Author’s representation. 
Apart from the general constraint that all debt instruments are only applicable to projects 
with a financial return and – if private sector financiers are involved – project-related risks 
that stay under common thresholds, there might be a further restriction especially for very 
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The second argument is that innovative project types or new technologies might need 
more aid and have in consequence a much lower public-to-private capital ratio. Just 
looking at the leverage potential might, thus, discriminate innovative solutions and hamper 
the necessary progress of the green transformation. 
Finally, as IFC (2013a) points out, leverage is important; nevertheless, it is not the only 
goal. Greenhouse gas reductions, poverty reduction, or job creation might be measures 
that are not captured by the simple calculation of leverage ratios. 
Aside from these desired goals, public intervention – especially when making use of 
subsidies – always brings with it the risk of creating market distortions. Consequently, the 
negative external effects of the instruments should be weighed up carefully against the 
desired goals of the intervention. Market distortions can be created at the level of the project, 
e.g. among energy producers, but also at the level of local financial markets, if the subsidies 
are allocated to a partner bank. Table 3 summarises for the different instruments which 
market is potentially most at risk of suffering some turnovers due to the public intervention. 
For grants, loans, and green bonds, the risk of creating market distortions exists above all 
at the project level, while credit lines and structured funds might distort local financial 
markets. For guarantees and technical assistance the impact of the negative external effect 
depends on the allocation of the subsidy, i.e., whether the guarantee or the technical 
assistance is given to the project or to a financial intermediary. Equity is excluded in this 
overview, as it does not contain subsidies, but the simple fact that a project has been 
selected for an equity investment might create market power and consequently unfair 
competition as well. 
Table 3: Creation of market distortions 
Project-level Local financial market 
Grants 
Loans 
Green bonds 
Credit lines 
Structured funds 
Guarantees 
Technical assistance 
Source: Author’s representation. 
An important risk is that the public sector is crowding-out private investments instead of 
attracting them. For example, it became apparent that structured funds that are trying to 
on-lend their funds at market rates to partner financial institutions in the form of credit 
lines have problems to identify interested partners. The reason for this is that, in many 
countries, the best potential cooperation partners are flooded with concessional capital 
provided by development banks and are consequently not interested in capital lent at 
market rates. This means that often the most viable projects receive financing from the 
big development financing institutions at concessional terms and the private sector has 
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no chance of engaging in the business. In fact, some experts even point out that a proper 
competition among development financing institutions for providing capital to the few 
bankable projects takes place, as all want to have show-projects in their portfolio. 
5.4 Potential 
A final aspect for appraising the relevance of the instruments presented is their potential 
for being up-scaled in order to increase the amount of mobilised private capital (see 
Figure 8). It is evident that in order to fulfil the commitment of mobilising USD 100 
billion a year and even more for financing the trillions of USD that are needed for the 
green transformation in the next decades, much stronger efforts are needed. While this is 
true, it will probably be quite challenging to offer certain instruments at massive scale – 
at least without further research on convenient strategies for doing so. 
For instance, the way guarantees are used by now is hardly applicable to a much larger 
scale. Apart from the fact that they are in most cases designed for specific projects, the 
non-accountability of official ODA flows is a serious constraint to broader use by 
bilateral donors. This might, however, change after 2015 as the OECD DAC is currently 
working on suggestions of how guarantees could be included in the official records of 
development aid flows. 
Both structured funds and also institutions that are offering green bonds face a main 
bottleneck at the outflow side. In both cases the main challenge consists of building up a 
good investment portfolio. It is difficult to identify partner banks or projects at a 
sufficiently large scale. This might be due to a missing project pipeline, but also to the 
rough competition among international financial institutions for the few good partners or 
projects. Often it is even difficult to identify good banks that are interested in green 
investments, as they do not see the need to develop these complicated markets. Even if 
the management of the potential partner has been convinced, developing the expertise to 
carefully select project partners is a further lengthy process. Moreover, given the total 
size of, for instance, structured funds, they can often only have energy-efficiency 
projects in their portfolio as the huge investments in renewable energy (e.g. a wind park) 
do not offer sufficient diversification. 
For the current size of structured funds’ or green bonds’ issuances, finding investors is not 
an issue. However, making this kind of investment product attractive for the big 
institutional investors with their over USD 70 trillion under management would only be 
feasible by up-scaling enormously the amount of shares or bonds offered. For instance, 
issuances have to exceed 500 million to be interesting for big institutional investors as 
small divisions are not attractive for them. Still, even though the offer of shares, notes, and 
bonds would be given at scale, it is doubtful whether the huge players would include them 
in their investment portfolios. 
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investments. A country study in Indonesia (Böhnke et al. forthcoming) shows that 
liquidity is not the crucial impediment for investments in energy efficiency. The same is 
true in many other developing countries, even in Africa, where banks are in many cases 
quite liquid. The bottlenecks would in these cases rather be the unwillingness of financial 
institutions to take on risks and their lack of knowledge and track-record in lending to 
green projects. 
Consequently, for many of the instruments presented, it will be essential to find solutions 
for the broader use of them. However, thinking in financing terms alone will not be 
sufficient. It is necessary to adopt a differentiated approach analysing carefully what is 
really needed in which countries for which kind of projects. The next chapter will propose 
relevant research questions to bring the up-scaling of green investment forward. 
6 Identification of further research ideas 
As our knowledge about green finance and public leveraging instruments is still relatively 
limited, we will focus on emerging research questions in this section. We will argue for 
the need for quantitative analyses and then propose emerging research questions that it 
would be interesting to answer. 
6.1 Lack of quantitative analyses 
A quantitative assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of public spending that is 
aimed at mobilising private funds for green investments in developing countries has not 
yet been carried out for the simple reason that data is not available.33 Only a very limited 
number of data sources for green finance flows exist. Moreover, these are not 
comprehensive as they cover only specific sectors and a few countries. Data for 
developing countries are generally not included. Besides, many of the public instruments 
are quite new and do not have a reliable track-record yet. This is why the different existing 
publications by various researchers can be resumed under the heading of “stock-taking”. 
A rigorous quantitative assessment would be very important in order to search for best 
practices. The reason is that quantitative analysis is a very suitable method for providing 
general conclusions and making comparisons, and both are needed to better understand 
green financing and to design targeted policies. It may be that many mappings of green 
finance flows and case studies have been conducted recently, but econometric analyses 
have some really convincing advantages over these qualitative analyses: through 
                                                 
33 An exception is the OECD (2013b) which studies the effects of government policies on private finance 
for renewable energy investments. The authors find that particularly price-based instruments such as 
feed-in tariffs are positively correlated with the mobilisation of private finance. 
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econometric analyses it is possible to investigate larger cross-sections and longer time 
series separately or even jointly. 
The disadvantage of qualitative research is that it is really difficult to derive broadly 
applicable policy recommendations from descriptive and very specific results. In order to 
widen the scope of green investments, we need to have more general outcomes of research 
on green finance at our disposal. Using econometric analyses, generalisation is possible as 
the results are derived at a much more aggregated level. They can thus be used to deduce 
more general policy recommendations and provide a basis for appropriate policy action. 
For instance, we need to better understand the determinants of green public and private 
finance flows; the causal relation between different kinds of public support and the 
mobilisation of private capital; the robustness of these relationships over different set-ups; 
and the relative importance of different forms of support. All this could be analysed 
econometrically if data were available. 
National and international financial institutions as well as governments could provide the 
basis for these quantitative assessments of the leveraging of private funds for green 
investments by better collecting relevant data and facilitating the access of external 
researchers to the data. Today, most institutions are quite reluctant to provide data on 
green finance flows for various different reasons. For instance, a standard answer is that 
they would be willing to provide data – but only if all their competitors also do so. In 
order to move forward and upscale the investments in green projects in a significant way, 
opening these data sources to research seems to be a necessary condition. Giving 
researchers access to green finance data and enabling econometric analyses will lead to a 
more comprehensive understanding of green finance and public support activities for 
green investments. 
6.2 Possible research questions 
After making the argument for the need of quantitative analyses we will now give an 
overview of possible research questions which can be organised within six thematic 
groups: “public leveraging instruments”, “government support”, “institutional investors”, 
“domestic perspectives”, “lessons learned from industrial countries”, and “miscellaneous”. 
Research on public leveraging instruments 
The first set of research questions tries to increase the understanding of public leveraging 
instruments, the way they are designed, and how they work. For instance, it would be 
worthwhile to concentrate on the subsidies that form part of different instruments; on how 
they are included; and, even more importantly, on how they are allocated to avoid 
negative external effects like crowding-out of domestic private finance. 
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Furthermore, the causality between public support and the mobilisation of private capital 
as well as the relative cost-effectiveness of the different instruments with regard to 
leveraging, but also developing and climate-related goals, could be studied. 
A very interesting aspect of the mobilisation of private capital is the trade-off between 
additionality of private finance and leverage ratio. So far, not only many actors in the 
developing community but also researchers are concentrating on obtaining a high leverage 
ratio. However, when this ratio is really high, it is very doubtful whether the private 
investment is still additional or rather would have been realized anyway, just without the 
subsidy of the public co-financier.34 
Research on government support 
The next set of questions aims at increasing the understanding of government support: 
When is government support really required and for what reason? When is government 
intervention efficient and effective? Governments participate, for instance, in structured 
funds that are created by development banks without really knowing whether their 
contribution is providing funds, increasing reputation, alleviating risks, or just 
supplementing a nice add-on. Often, it is argued that government support is supposed to 
have a signalling effect for investors that certain types of investments are profitable and 
secure. However, it has not been analysed whether such an effect can really be observed. 
Furthermore, one may ask and analyse when is it that the cooperation of public and private 
donors is most efficient? What are the circumstances that provoke an increase in the 
efficiency of investments by the intervention of public donors? 
Another open question relates to the transmission channel of public support, i.e., whether 
providing financing to a project directly or via the transmission channel of a domestic 
development bank and a domestic commercial bank is the better approach. In other words, 
one could analyse the trade-off between subsidising the project directly and indirectly. The 
first option would ensure that the project really gets the government subsidy; while the 
second option facilitates learning effects and a track-record of lending on the side of 
domestic institutions and at the same time risks that the subsidized interest rates do not 
reach the project as every intermediary is charging a surplus to the rate. Applied to the 
German development system this would relate to the question of whether providing 
financing through DEG or KfW is the better way. 
Research on institutional investors 
Another set of emerging research questions deals with institutional investors and their role 
in green investments in developing countries. First of all, it would be interesting to analyse 
in greater detail which institutional investors invest in which countries in which sectors 
with the help of which instrument in which type of project. While there have certainly 
                                                 
34 See Bretton Woods Project (2012) for a critical discussion of this issue. 
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been many case studies conducted that answer these questions for individual projects, a 
systematisation of the information is still missing. 
Once we have such a dataset, we could continue and analyse econometrically the relevant 
characteristics for the engagement of institutional investors. A related question would be 
how much capital institutional investors are really willing to invest in green projects – 
both in developed and developing countries? Many studies have been conducted on the 
amounts that institutional investors could possibly invest but so far nobody has analysed 
the realistic amount of investments that can be expected from them. Moreover, we do not 
have much information on the types of risks that investors are willing to take for money 
and which risks are really the knock-out elements. 
Another open issue is the role that institutional investors, or private investors in general, 
could have in the provision of adaptation finance, as these projects are generally less 
profitable for the investor. 
Research on domestic perspectives 
One shortcoming of the debate on leveraging private finance for green investments in 
developing countries is that it mainly addresses international aspects. However, even 
today a large portion of private capital comes from domestic resources. Domestic 
investors receive the risks in a different way, first of all because they do not face currency 
risks, but also because they know the local policy and understand the political risks. The 
qualitative characteristics of south finance are different as they understand the risk-return 
at the macro-level and not just on a project-level. Focusing on domestic perspectives 
provides several research ideas. First of all, it would be worthwhile to analyse how 
domestic capital can be mobilised. The reason is that, even today, a relevant part of project 
finance is raised domestically. 
Closely related to this aspect is the question of how the enabling environment in the 
country of project implementation should be designed and how improvements of this 
environment could be achieved? 
When studying domestic financial markets an interesting aspect would be whether green 
transformation sectors have specific problems to access financing or whether they face any 
other specific barriers to get funding. Tied to this analysis is the question of whether there 
are any regional patterns. Thus, analysing regional bond markets would be another option 
for research. 
Investigating domestic perspectives is certainly rewarding, but a holistic approach would 
be even more interesting: to study the mobilisation of private capital for green investments 
in developing countries considering both international and domestic finance, regulation, 
and enabling environment. 
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Research on lessons learned from industrial countries 
As data availability in general is difficult for developing countries (quite apart from the 
general problem, mentioned above, of accessing green finance data), another set of 
questions deals with lessons learned from industrial countries. Many of the questions 
related to effectiveness and causality that have been laid out above could be analysed with 
a richer data basis for industrial countries in order to deduce recommendations for 
developing countries. 
From a German perspective we could focus especially on the lessons learned in Germany, 
for example with regard to feed-in-tariffs. 
Focusing on green investments more globally, an interesting approach would also be to 
study volatility of the provision of green finance by the private sector. By this we could 
find out, how volatile the engagement is, and whether developing countries should really 
rely on them for funding their green transformation. 
Further research questions 
Under the category of “miscellaneous” it is possible to instantiate two further questions. 
The first refers to the demand side of green finance: What do firms in developing 
countries really need – Is it subsidised credits for green investments or is it just access to 
finance even at market rate for all kind of investments? 
The second question relates to a more political dimension: How could the experiences of 
the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) be transferred to the Green Climate Fund (GCF)? 
What are the lessons learnt and which instruments have been the most useful? 
Although this collection of research questions is most probably far from being 
comprehensive, it proposes quite a number of different research foci. Having said that, the 
overall question remains as to whether financial institutions and governments will provide 
access to the relevant green finance data that will make these analyses possible. 
7 Summary and policy recommendations 
Summary 
In order to combat imminent climate change, we have to green the economy. As public 
budgets alone will not be able to provide the necessary financing, additional resources 
have to be mobilised, particularly for green investments in developing countries and 
emerging markets. Although climate can be considered a systemic risk for the financing 
industry, private and institutional investors are very reluctant to invest in green finance 
products or projects. The reason is straightforward: the risk-return calculus is not attractive 
enough. 
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This problem could be solved automatically if a global carbon price existed that was 
included in all economic considerations. Given the absence of an adequate price for 
carbon emissions, policymakers have to fall back on second-, third- or even fourth-best 
solutions to incentivise private investors to provide the necessary capital for a green 
transformation. This allows governments to make use of various different public 
instruments with which to leverage private capital for green investments. Eight different 
instruments that can be grouped into three categories – namely those that primarily 
provide funding to projects; those that transfer knowledge or risk; and those that raise 
additional private funds – have been discussed in this paper. 
The eight instruments that have been studied have different advantages and weaknesses. 
More importantly, however, they are relevant for different project development phases, 
country environments, and purposes. Adequate solutions, e.g. adapted mixes of 
instruments, will vary within countries, regions, technologies, and projects.  
The potential for mainstreaming green finance and using these instruments on a much 
larger scale is relatively limited. In-depth knowledge about effectiveness and the causal 
implications of green finance in general, and leveraging instruments in particular, is very 
incomplete. In consequence, it is not clear which would be the best way to attain this goal. 
Much more knowledge of green finance in general and public leveraging instruments in 
specific will be needed. The fact that there is a lack of internationally agreed definitions of 
key terms, such as “green finance”, “climate finance”, or “leverage ratio” is a serious 
hurdle to the discussion and implementation of green finance. It is difficult to make 
research comparable. 
Moreover, we lack data on green investments, as development finance institutions and the 
private and institutional finance sector are reluctant to publish data on green finance. This 
hampers the rigorous evaluation of existing experiences and the delivery of lessons-
learned about best practices and broadly applicable business models. 
Policy recommendations 
• We need more knowledge in the field of green finance. A coordinated effort to collect 
the data related to green financing deals from development banks would allow one to 
assess the existing experiences quantitatively and deduce more general conclusions and 
recommendations. 
• We need more transparency and cooperation among the various different international 
bodies that are discussing green finance. More exchange could help to implement con-
sistent, concise and apt policy actions that speed-up the rise of green finance. 
• Governments should not forget that green investments necessarily require financing, 
but that the enabling environment is at least as important. It would be helpful if gov-
ernments were to set up a mutual green agenda among the various different ministries 
to align the support to green investments. 
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• A green transformation is a societal challenge. To make the use of public leveraging 
instruments more effective, investors – and also their clients – have to be educated and 
informed. 
• Whatever support for green finance is implemented, it must be as simple and easy to 
understand as possible. This is especially true when considering green investments in 
developing countries and emerging economies as in this case two investment areas 
come together that are both considered to be very complicated. 
• Governments should make use of all different types of public instruments to leverage 
private capital as each is useful for different purposes, project phases, and situations. 
Also, UNFCCC’s Green Climate Fund should consider expanding their instruments be-
yond grants and concessional lending and making use of the whole range of instru-
ments that are available. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Institutions and initiatives working on green finance 
Acronym Name Description 
3GF  Global Green 
Growth Forum 
A global public-private partnership consisting of the Governments of Denmark, South 
Korea, Mexico, China, Kenya, and Qatar together with a number of leading global 
corporations and international organisations. The idea behind this forum is as simple as it 
is promising: Bringing all relevant parties together in order to intensify large-scale 
public-private action to accelerate the transformation to a green economy. Each year in 
Copenhagen, 3GF convenes the leaders of established and emerging public-private 
partnerships clustered around different growth sectors within the green growth spectrum. 
CDKN  Climate and 
Development 
Knowledge 
Network 
Supports decision-makers in designing and delivering climate compatible development. It 
does this by combining research, advisory services and knowledge management in 
support of locally owned and managed policy processes. CDKN works in partnership 
with decision-makers in the public, private and non-governmental sectors nationally, 
regionally and globally. The Climate Development Knowledge Network is managed by 
an alliance of organisations lead by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC), and including 
Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano, INTRAC, LEAD International, the Overseas 
Development Institute, and SouthSouthNorth. 
CEM  Clean Energy 
Ministerial 
A high-level global forum to promote policies and programmes that advance clean 
energy technology, to share lessons learned and best practices, and to encourage the 
transformation to a global clean energy economy. 
CPI  Climate Policy 
Initiative 
A global policy effectiveness analysis and advisory organisation. Its mission is to assess, 
diagnose, and support nations’ efforts to achieve low-carbon growth. An independent, not-
for-profit organisation supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations, CPI’s 
headquarters are in San Francisco and regional offices are situated in Beijing, Hyderabad, 
Rio de Janeiro, and Venice. Main publication: “Global Landscape of Climate Finance”. 
FSB  Financial Stability 
Board 
Has been established to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial 
authorities and international standard-setting bodies and to develop and promote the 
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies in 
the interest of financial stability. FSB is focused on financial regulatory factors affecting 
the availability, cost, time horizon and other terms of LT finance. 
G2A2  Green Growth 
Action Alliance 
Includes over 50 of the world’s largest energy companies, international financial 
institutions and development finance banks working to deliver greater investments into 
clean energy, transportation, agriculture and other green investments (Secretariat is 
WEF). Above all it has a facilitating role, conducting workshops in pilot countries. 
GGGI  Global Green 
Growth Institute 
A new kind of international organisation. GGGI provides support for the development of 
green growth plans (GGPs) when it receives a high-level request from a developing or 
emerging country government. GGGI’s Research Programme is designed to support the 
delivery of GGGI’s Green Growth Planning and Implementation programmes. Some of 
GGGI’s research is generated primarily by in-house researchers and draws heavily on 
GGGI’s green growth planning and implementation experience in developing and 
emerging countries. Other research is conducted in partnership with leading economic 
policy institutes and research centres in both developing and advanced countries, 
especially on more theoretical and technology-focused issues (among others, Brookings 
Institution, London School of Economics, OECD, World Bank, and UNEP). GGGI 
jointly serves as the GGKP Secretariat with UNEP. ADB, DFID, GIZ, BMU, 3GF, 
GGKP, OECD, WB, WEF among others are partners (role not further specified). 
GGKP  Green Growth 
Knowledge 
Platform 
A global network of researchers and development experts that identifies and addresses 
major knowledge gaps in green growth theory and practice. It is a core partnership 
between GGGI, OECD, UNEP, and the World Bank. Through widespread consultation 
and world-class research, GGKP provides practitioners and policymakers with better 
tools to foster economic growth and implement sustainable development 
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Table A1: continued 
Acronym Name Description 
GIC Global Investor 
Coalition on 
Climate Change 
The four regional climate change investor groups IIGCC (Europe), INCR (North 
America), IGCC (Australia & New Zealand) and AIGCC (Asia) have formed a global 
coalition. The coalition will conduct shared initiatives on climate policy, international 
agreements and international projects of common interest. Domestic policy positions and 
services to members will remain the purview of the regional member groups. Called the 
“Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change”, the coalition will provide a global 
platform for dialogue between and amongst investors and governments on international 
policy and investment practice related to climate change. 
GIIN  Global Impact 
Investing 
Network 
A non-profit organisation dedicated to increasing the scale and effectiveness of impact 
investing. Impact investments are investments made into companies, organisations, and 
funds with the intention of generating measurable social and environmental impact 
alongside a financial return. They can be made in both emerging and developed markets, 
and target a range of returns from below market to market rate, depending upon the 
circumstances. The GIIN addresses systemic barriers to effective impact investing by 
building critical infrastructure and developing activities, education, and research that 
attract more investment capital to poverty alleviation and environmental solutions. IRIS 
is a set of standardised metrics that can be used to describe an organisation’s social, 
environmental, and financial performance. 
IDFC International 
Development 
Finance Club 
A new network of renowned national and sub-regional development banks. 
IFC  International 
Finance 
Corporation 
Undertook stock-takings for the G20 DPIGI (extended literature review; mapping of 
ongoing efforts to track finance flows; building a repository of success stories to leverage 
private finance; review of initiatives to engage institutional investors). 
IGCC Investor Group on 
Climate Change 
Australia/New 
Zealand 
The IGCC represents institutional investors, with total funds under management of 
approximately USD 900 billion, and others in the investment community interested in the 
impact of climate change on investments. The IGCC aims to encourage government 
policies and investment practices that address the risks and opportunities of climate 
change, for the ultimate benefit of superannuates and unit holders. 
IIGCC The Institutional 
Investors Group 
on Climate 
Change 
A forum for collaboration on climate change for European investors. It provides investors 
with a collaborative platform to encourage public policies, investment practices, and 
corporate behaviour that address the long-term risks and opportunities associated with 
climate change. IIGCC currently has over 80 members, including some of the largest 
pension funds and asset managers in Europe, representing around EUR 7.5 trillion in assets. 
INCR Investor Network 
on Climate Risk  
A network of 100 institutional investors representing more than USD 10 trillion in assets 
committed to addressing the risks and seizing the opportunities resulting from climate 
change and other sustainability challenges. 
IRENA International 
Renewable 
Energy Agency 
An intergovernmental organisation that supports countries in their transition to a 
sustainable energy future, and serves as the principal platform for international 
cooperation, a centre of excellence, and a repository of policy, technology, resource and 
financial knowledge on renewable energy. IRENA promotes the widespread adoption and 
sustainable use of all forms of renewable energy, including bio energy, geothermal, 
hydropower, ocean, solar and wind energy in the pursuit of sustainable development, 
energy access, energy security and low-carbon economic growth and prosperity. 
ODI  Overseas 
Development 
Institute 
UK's leading independent think tank on international development and humanitarian 
issues. Research focus in climate finance: (i) Mapping the delivery of programmatic 
funding for climate change at the national (and sub-national) level so that the needs of the 
poor are met; (ii) Defining the international architecture that will best support 
strengthened national governance of climate finance; (iii) Determining the scope of the 
private sector’s role in transferring financial resources to vulnerable countries. 
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Table A1: continued 
Acronym Name Description 
OECD  Organisation for 
Economic Co-
operation and 
Development 
The OECD Secretariat collects and analyses data, after which committees discuss policy 
regarding this information, the Council makes decisions, and then governments 
implement recommendations. It is currently conducting case studies on institutional 
investors investing with the help of national development banks (NDBs) in green 
infrastructure and analysing the BNEF data. It offers the possibility of organising events 
to convene different stakeholders. 
OPIC  Overseas Private 
Investment 
Corporation 
US Government's Development Finance Institution. John Morton is focusing on 
standardisation of securitisation. 
REN21 Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Network for the 
21st Century 
REN21 is the global renewable energy policy multi-stakeholder network that connects a 
wide range of key actors to facilitate knowledge exchange, policy development and joint 
action towards a rapid global transition to renewable energy. REN21 promotes renewable 
energy to meet the needs of both industrialised and developing countries that are driven 
by climate change, energy security, development and poverty alleviation.  
REPP Renewable 
Energy 
Performance 
Platform 
REPP is jointly developed by the European Investment Bank and UNEP as a response to 
the United Nations’ SE4All initiative. The platform will be structured as two separate, 
complementary vehicles to support first mover projects which are developed to operate in 
newly established policy environments – 1) the Performance Facility and 2) a Debt 
Facility. The Frankfurt School-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable 
Energy Finance was given the assignment in October 2012 by the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) to conduct a market study for the REPP to assess the renewable energy (RE) 
and energy efficiency (EE) investment potential and the regulatory environment for RE 
and EE investments in Africa. 
SE4ALL Sustainable 
Energy for All 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is leading a global initiative on Sustainable Energy 
for All to mobilise action from all sectors of society in support of three interlinked 
objectives to be achieved by 2030: providing universal access to modern energy services; 
doubling the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency; and doubling the share of 
renewable energy in the global energy mix.  
UNEP-FI  United Nations 
Environment 
Programme 
Finance Initiative 
A global partnership between UNEP and the financial sector. Over 200 institutions, 
including banks, insurers and fund managers, work with UNEP to understand the impacts 
of environmental and social considerations on financial performance. While they do 
some research, they mostly organise events and offering training and networking 
opportunities. 
WRI  World Resources 
Institute 
Centre for policy research and analysis addressed to global resource and environmental 
issues in Washington. WRI focuses on the technical and institutional aspects of three 
major questions: (i) How to SHIFT finance from high carbon to low carbon and climate 
resilient investments (mainstreaming); (ii) How to LEVERAGE private flows using 
public climate finance (domestic and international) and (iii) How to ASSESS the impact 
or effectiveness of climate finance, whether positive or negative. 
  Climate Funds 
Update  
A joint initiative of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBF) and the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI). The team monitors dedicated climate change funds from the stage when 
donors pledge funding, through to the actual disbursement of financing for projects, in an 
effort to increase the transparency of climate finance flows. Provide data on homepage. 
  San Giorgio 
Group  
A working group established in 2011 by CPI, World Bank Group, China Light&Power 
and OECD to conduct case studies on climate finance. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Table A2: Short overview of public financing instruments 
Instrument Strength Weakness Applicability 
Equity • risk reduction for other 
investors 
• gives accreditation  
• shareholders are the 
last to be compensated 
• high transaction costs  
• only feasible for larger 
projects (due to high 
transaction costs) 
Grants • simple to implement 
and manage (no ongo-
ing administration) 
• most risky for donor: 
limited control and no 
recourse 
•  do not give incentives 
for delivery 
• easily applicable to all 
kind of projects 
• especially for early 
project development 
phase 
Loans • lower capital financing 
costs 
• obligation to repay can 
give incentives for pro-
ject viability 
• need for due diligence 
increases costs 
• degree of concessional-
ity is hard to estimate 
• projects of relative big 
scale (project evalua-
tion) 
• more developed pro-
jects  
Credit lines • increase comfort and 
awareness of financial 
intermediaries in lend-
ing to new sec-
tors/project types 
• financial intermediary 
can complement fund-
ing with own resources 
• principal-agent prob-
lems 
• accounting procedures 
might diverge and in-
crease costs  
• wide-spread use 
• more developed pro-
jects 
Green bonds • potential to bundle 
projects reduces risk 
and financing costs 
• sophisticated markets 
required to be able to 
analyse and price the 
bonds 
• high administration 
costs 
• only for developed 
projects and proven 
technologies 
Structured funds • reduce investment 
transaction costs 
• possibility of diversifi-
cation 
• offer investment to 
investors with different 
risk-return tolerances 
• improve risk-reward 
calculus of private in-
vestors (first loss, sub-
ordinated position) 
• high transaction cost • relatively limited due to 
transaction and coordi-
nation costs 
• only for developed 
projects 
Guarantees • crowd-in private fi-
nancing 
•  easy to obtain political 
approval as there is no 
high up-front financing 
• high transaction costs 
• accounting is difficult  
• not fully accountable 
for ODA 
• for projects in a more 
developed stage of im-
plementation 
Technical assistance • facilitates further fi-
nancing 
• helps to establish track-
record 
• high transaction costs • broad range 
• also for projects in an 
early development 
phase 
• useful for projects and 
banks 
Source: Author’s representation. 
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Box A1: Climate-relevant ODA from Germany 
 
In 2011, Germany committed a total of EUR 3,468,795,092.67 to climate-relevant ODA. This figure includes 
all flows that have at least a value of 1 for one of the four Rio-markers. The total sum can be divided into 
• EUR 1,599,352,437.69 for grants, 
• EUR 1,849,442,654.98 for loans, and 
• EUR 20,000,000.00 for equity investments (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: Total climate-relevant commitments in 2011 (German ODA) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s representation. 
 
 
The recipient countries vary according to the instrument. For instance, nearly half of the loans have been 
directed to Asia (see Figure 10 and Figure 11). There is only one equity investment that took place in Europe. 
 
Figure 10: Recipients of grants (German climate-related ODA, 2011) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s representation. 
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Box A1: continued 
 
Figure 11: Recipients of loans (German climate-related ODA, 2011) 
 
 
Source: Author’s representation. 
 
 
The most relevant sectors for grants have been general environmental protection, followed by water and 
sanitation and energy generation and supply (see Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: Grants sector (German climate-related ODA, 2011) 
 
 
Source: Author’s representation. 
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Box A1: continued 
 
The majority of the loans have been directed to the energy generation and supply sector, followed by water and 
sanitation (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: Loans sector (German climate-related ODA, 2011) 
 
 
Source: Author’s representation. 
 
An important limitation of these statistics on the German ODA flows is that we do not have the information by 
which instrument the projects themselves have been financed. Neither, whether - and if this is the case - how 
much private finance has been leveraged. For instance, the money that has been provided by the German 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) for the Global Climate 
Partnership Fund has been a grant (see Box 5). Consequently, the German ODA statistics report a grant, even 
though the relevant financial product to mobilise further financing has been a structured fund. 
 
Source: Data provided by the BMZ, Referat 414 (OECD/DAC, ODA-Statistik). 
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